Abstract. How can a RFID (Radio Frequency Identification Devices) system prove that two or more RFID tags are in the same location? Previous researchers have proposed yoking-proof and grouping-proof techniques to address this problem -and when these turned out to be vulnerable to replay attacks, a new existence-proof technique was proposed. We critique this class of existence-proofs and show it has three problems: (a) a race condition when multiple readers are present; (b) a race condition when multiple tags are present; and (c) a problem determining the number of tags. We present two new proof techniques, a secure timestamp proof (secTS-proof) and a timestampchaining proof (chaining-proof) that avoid replay attacks and solve problems in previously proposed techniques.
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID), are supported by systems comprised of wireless readers and tags, and allows objects to be identified and, in some cases, tracked. [1] The most commonly used tags, passive tags, are inexpensive devices powered by radio signals from readers. They have sharply limited memory and processing capabilities. Some argue that RFID tags allow less expensive inventory management capabilities. [2] One important issue for RFID systems is generation of coexistence proofs demonstrating two or more RFID tags are simultaneously located. The key contribution of this paper is a critique of previous RFID coexistence proofs and a set of new proofs avoiding previous shortcomings.
Here are some motivating examples: 1) Medical care: a medical professional can prove that a set of correct drugs, blood products, or other medical materials are brought together for patient needs. The proof can be retained in case of dispute or for insurance purposes. [3] 2) Transportation: a transport or logistic firm can prove that items are always stored together in a safe box, if RFID tags are on the box and contents. [3] 3) Forensics: if RFID tags are on phones or other personal devices, law enforcement can use it to identify witnesses to a crime.
Here is a brief summary of prior work: Juels defined yoking-proofs which use a random number independently generated by tags to produce a coexistence proof. [3] Saito and Sakurai observed that yoking-proofs are vulnerable to replay attacks and proposed grouping-proofs that request timestamps from a trusted server. [4] Piramuthu observed that grouping-proofs were still vulnerable to replay attacks and proposed existence-proofs that keep a random number in the tag memory and sets the inputs of one tag to information generated by a second tag. [5] We can group these techniques into those using an off-line verifier (yoking-proofs) and those using an online verifier (grouping-proofs and existence-proofs).
We show existence-proofs have three problems:
• A race condition when multiple readers are present;
• A race condition when multiple tags are present; and • Difficulties in determining the number of tags.
We give two new proof techniques:
• a secure timestamp proof (secTS-proof) -a proof technique based on a secure online verifier that issues secure timestamps; and • a timestamp-chaining proof (chaining-proof) -a proof technique based on a secure off-line verifier. [6] 2 Related Work
Yoking-Proof
In yoking-proofs, the reader interacts with two RFID tags, T A and T B , and an off-line verifier (FV). T A and T B share secret keys x A and x B with FV and generate random numbers r A and r B , respectively, in every session. Figure 1 gives the protocol. After receiving P AB , the reader forwards P AB , r A and r B to FV.
"left proof"
(2) a = (A, r A ) (3) "right proof", r A Because each tag uses a random number to compute a MAC, an adversarial reader can perform a replay attack by reusing previously generated random values. Saito and Sakurai showed a replay attack on T A (see Figure 2 -the dashed line indicates the reader interacts with T A and T B at different times) [4] and Piramuthu showed a replay attack on T B [5] . The yoking-proof technique cannot be repaired since the adversarial reader can send P AB , r A and r to FV for verification and ignores r B .
Reader (Attacker) (1) "left proof" (2) a = (A, r A ) (6) "right proof", r A 
Grouping-Proof
Saito and Sakurai give a grouping-proof technique with the intention of avoiding replay attacks. [4] The reader acquires a timestamp (TS) from an on-line verifier (OV) and sends it to T A and T B . T A and T B individually compute m A and m B using the secret keys x A and x B -see Figure 3 . After receiving proof P AB , the reader sends P AB , A, and B to OV. Grouping-proofs rely on a timeout mechanism -if the OV receives P AB at time more than TS+Δ, it rejects the proof. Product tags and a pallet tag share their secret keys with OV. The reader gathers n MACs from the product tag T i (1 i n ≤ ≤ ) and sends them to the pallet tag. The pallet tag encrypts n MACs m i and TS to generate the ciphertext Cp. After the reader receives Cp from the pallet tag, it sends P 1~n and all T i (1 i n ≤ ≤ ) to OV. OV first checks whether P 1~n are within the timeout range. OV decrypts Cp using x to get m i . OV verifies m i using x i . Note that this approach is also vulnerable to replay attacks.
Existence-Proof
Piramuthu proposes existence-proofs with the intention of avoiding replay attacks. [5] His idea is to ensure that inputs to a tag depend on information generated by other tags. Figure 6 shows his approach:
• The reader requests random number r from OV, which in term is a seed for generating r A and r B by tags T A and T B .
• T B generates m B which depends on both r and r A .
• T A uses m B and r A to generate m A .
Tag T B Reader (2) request, r Since both T A and T B rely on values generated by the other, it is robust against replay attacks. This scheme also uses a timeout mechanism to ensure the freshness of proofs.
Problems of Existence-Proofs
While existence-proofs avoid replay attacks, they have other problems. First, when tag T A interacts with multiple readers, a race condition can occur (Figure 7 does not know which r Ai is used with m Bi to generate m Ai , causing a different type of race condition, which we call the race condition for multiple tags.
Two Proposed Coexistence-Proofs
Above, we distinguished between systems with online verifiers and off-line verifiers. Below we give two proposed proof types, secTS-proof (with an online verifier) and chaining-proof (with an off-line verifier.) Figure 9 shows the secTS-proof. To prevent adversarial readers from generating bogus timestamps, when the reader requests OV, OV generates a random number r and uses its secret key x to encrypt TS and r to create a unique S. OV also checks the freshness of proofs -if a proof is submitted after TS+Δ, it is rejected. Figure 10 shows the chaining-proof. In this scheme, the reader can issue the timestamp by itself. Because there is not an on-line verifier to monitor the reader's behavior, an attacker may issue a bogus timestamp. We use Haber-Stornetta timestamps [6] to avoid attack; each new timestamp is formed by taking a hash and using the hash value and MAC from previous timestamps. Because the reader does not have the tag's secret key, the timestamp can be generated until the last timestamp has been obtained. To complete verification, the reader must report the last timestamp, tag id, and timestamp MAC computed by the tag to an offline trusted third party (timestamp database TSD). When TSD receives the timestamp, it marks the timestamp information with a trusted time value. In the chaining-proof, each tag shares its secret key x i with FV. Furthermore, the reader reports timestamps ms i =(T i , TS i (h (ms i-1 ) ), m i ) to TSD, where i indicates the sequence that the reader scans the tags. ms 0 is a random number r acquired from TSD. Once TSD receives one ms i , TSD stores and combines ms i with a time (RT i ) which means when TSD receives this ms i . The procedure of chaining-proof for multiple tags is described as follows: 
Sketch of Security Proof
Space does not permit a full proof of security; so here we just provide a sketch of security for the chaining-proof. (SecTS-proofs are substantially simpler to show security for.) We assume an adversary can control one or more reader, but not a verifier or TSD. We assume that our cryptographic functions observe standard requirements (see [6] for a fuller discussion of security of the timestamp mechanism.). Now the sketch of the proof is straightforward. Refer to Figure 10 . If the tag T 2 is not in range of an adversarial reader the attacker cannot get m 2 from T 2 . Without m 2 , the adversary cannot compute ms 2 =(T 2 ||TS 2 (h(ms 1 ))||m 2 ) and cannot submit ms 2 to the online timestamp database (TSD). Alternatively, if the adversary waits for the tag T 2 , TSD will mark ms 2 with the later time timestamp (RT 2 ) -and if this exceeds timeout range Δ, the key will be discarded. Replay attacks against T 1 , T 3 , T 4 , …, T n are not possible for parallel reasons. Note that because the reader uses a random number r from TSD and this value is combined with a trusted time in TSD, FV can discover if an adversarial tries to collect information by interacting individually with each tag using bogus timestamps at some later time.
Note further, if a proof P 1234 =(r, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , TS 1 (r), TS 2 (h(ms 1 )), TS 3 (h(ms 2 )), TS 4 (h(ms 3 ))) is already verified and is valid. If an adversarial reader attempts to duplicate the same proof by using a valid r and insert existence evidence of T 5 , i.e. (T 5 , TS 5 (h(ms 4 )), in this proof, the attack will be detected, since each timestamp inside the proof chains is reported to TSD.
Conclusion
We showed three RFID co-existence proof types (yoking-proofs, grouping-proofs, and existence-proofs) suffer from a number of problems: replay attacks, race conditions, and ambiguity in the number of tags. We proposed two novel proof types: secTS-proofs and chaining-proofs. SecTS-proof is applied on the environment having an online verifier while chaining-proof is used on the environment having an off-line verifier. Our two schemes successfully avoid all known attacks, including replay attacks.
